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Legal Writing: Its Nature, Limits,
and Dangers
by Douglas Litowitz"
Lawyers have a unique and highly technical manner of writing, one
that differs significantly from standard English. Legal education
involves an indoctrination into this new discourse, a process that ends
when one awakens to find oneself writing in a manner that once seemed
impossibly obscure. Of course, the mastery of legal language reflects a
paradigm shift in thought, sometimes called "learning to think like a
lawyer" or "seeing things from a legal perspective." The conceptual
scheme and language of the law are so different from the ordinary way
of thinking that Lord Coke was
1 perhaps correct when he characterized
the law as "artificial reason."
Law students typically undergo a conversion experience during the
first year of law school, when they begin to see the world in terms of
property, contracts, torts, and remedies. For the great majority of
students, this conversion is irreversible; once taught to think like a
lawyer, the dye is cast and it is only a matter of time until the existing
legal framework seems natural and inevitable. Although this conversion
process lasts for months, most lawyers forget or repress their initial
struggle to master legal concepts and to express themselves in legal
terminology. Once acquired, the technical language of the law becomes
a pair of glasses that one looks through but not at, a mere tool that does
not merit contemplation in its own right. From day-to-day, lawyers are
immersed in a specialized manner of writing to the point where they no
longer pay attention to it, much as a person can wear a suit and tie for
years without reflecting on it. Perhaps this helps to explain why legal

* Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Oberlin College (B.A.,

1985); Northwestern University School of Law (J.D., 1988); Loyola University Chicago
(Ph.D., Philosophy 1996). The author wishes to thank Professor Linda Edwards for her

comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Sir Edward Coke, Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1907, orig. 1738).
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scholars have failed to treat legal writing as a genre worthy of legal
scholarship in its own right,2 and why law schools generally treat legal
writing as a skills course instead of a substantive course.
When we temporarily suspend our use of legal writing as a mechanism
for achieving particular results within the legal system and instead hold
it up for inspection in its own right, serious and troubling questions
arise.' For one thing, we can rightfully wonder about the psychological
effect on lawyers of producing this artificial language all day, every day.
We also need to ask whether such tortured prose is really integral for
the existence of law as a social institution, or whether we could plausibly
replace it with a simpler, less formal manner of writing (or perhaps
eliminate legal writing as a unique genre altogether). Finally, we need
to explore the social and political consequences of propagating a
discourse that is too complicated for ordinary citizens to grasp. With
regard to the manner of thinking, speaking, and writing that has become
second nature to us, we need to ask, "What are its limits, its dangers, its
potential?"
In this Article, I assert that a unique and formal style of writing is
necessary and inevitable, because legal writing functions as the medium
for the expression of higher-order principles that bind and shape our
interaction with other people and with the physical world. Through
legal writing we bring one possible version of the world into existence,
which means that legal discourse constitutes a "way of worldmaking,"4

2. Notable exceptions include Joel Cornwell, Legal Writing as a Kind ofPhilosophy, 48
MERCER L. REv. 1091 (1997); James R. Elkins, What Kind of Story is Legal Writing?, 20
LEGAL STUD. FORUM 95, 95 (1996) (noting a "growing intellectual and scholarly

sophistication in the field of legal writing"); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield,
Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35 (1994).
3. In this Article, I will be using the term "legal writing" in the broadest possible sense
to denote the formal and substantive manner of writing employed in such distinctly legal
documents as pleadings, contracts, inter-office memoranda, client letters, and judicial
opinions.
4.

NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING

(1978); see also PETER

BERGER, WAYS

OF SEEING (1977). Pierre Bourdieu captures this point in his depiction of legal discourse
as a "legitimate language," a code used by authorities to construct the social world:
Legal discourse is a creative speech which brings into existence that which it
utters. It is the limit aimed at by all performative utterances-blessings, curses,
orders, wishes or insults. In other words, it is the divine word, the word of divine
right, which, like the intuitus originariuswhich Kant ascribed to God, creates
what it states, in contrast to all derived, observational statements, which simply
record a pre-existent given.
PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 41 (1991). Bourdieu is also correct
in his rejection of language as a neutral medium, and his insistence that language must
be understood as an "instrument of action and power." Id. at 37.
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a weltanschauung, or "conceptual scheme" by virtue of mapping out the
world in a restricted and specialized manner. Because of the heavy
burden carried by legal language-the fact that it is literally a matter
of life and death, not to mention money-it must be somewhat abstract,
detailed, and distanced. Having said this, I also want to point out that
the classic, accepted style of legal writing carries dangers that need to
be articulated if we are to adopt a critical posture toward our practices.
I begin this Article in Part I by distinguishing legal writing from
legalese, so that we may appropriately focus on the former. In Part II,
I argue that a unique legal language is necessary and inevitable, but
also dangerous in certain respects. Finally, in Part III, I articulate four
dangers of legal writing: First, it distorts, obscures, and legitimates
unequal power relations; second, it narrows the range of thought and
emotion; third, it emphasizes formality at the expense of substance; and
fourth, it becomes hyper-technical and difficult to navigate by nonlawyers, thereby distancing and alienating them from the legal system.
I.

LEGAL WRITING VERSUS LEGALESE

Law is a profession of language and writing; lawyers get paid for
drafting persuasive documents and speaking for clients. Lawyers have
no choice but to write, and they must write in a certain style for their
writing to qualify as a distinctly legal work product. To write in this
way is not optional, but is rather a condition for the possibility of
practicing law.
Legal scholars have long recognized the disjunction between legal
language and common parlance. In a careful study, David Mellinkoff
noted nine major ways that legal language differs from standard
English:
(1) Frequent use of common words -with uncommon meanings; (2)
Frequent use of Old English and Middle English words once in common
use, but not now; (3) Frequent use of Latin words and phrases; (4) Use
of Old French and Anglo-Norman words which have not been taken
into the general vocabulary; (5) Use of terms of art; (6) Use of argot; (7)
Frequent use of formal words; (8) Deliberate use of words and expressions with flexible meanings; and (9) Attempts at extreme precision of

expression.6

5. "The general system of concepts with which we organize our thoughts and
perceptions." OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 72 (Simon Blackburn ed. 1994). For a

critical rejection of the idea of discrete conceptual schemes see DONALD DAVIDSON, On the
Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 183

(1984).
6.

DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 11 (1963).
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Apart from the restriction imposed by using only approved words from
a limited lexicon, lawyers are further constrained as a matter of syntax
and form. For example, a complaint must be divided into counts,
numbered paragraphs, and prayers for relief; a contract must contain a
caption, recitals, agreements, and a signature page; a client letter must
delineate the specific issue researched by the lawyer and then provide
a carefully guarded opinion. In each case, the attorney works from prior
forms, and while this provides a measure of security and efficiency, it
also confirms and legitimates the use of traditional instruments and
styles of writing.
Because of the mandatory nature of legal writing (the fact that an
attorney must write in this way to practice), lawyers inevitably succumb
to tradition, because their language is quite literally a bricolage of
terminology and doctrines from earlier times.7 When practicing law, it
is almost as if language is speaking the person instead of the person
making use of the language.8 Lawyers take the language as they find
it, and more to the point, they perpetuate this language regardless of
their personal feelings about it. This linguistic determination of the free
subject was captured in literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin's statement that
"words have 'conditions attached to them': it is not strictly speaking, I
who speak; I perhaps would speak quite differently.'
The first step toward understanding legal writing is to distinguish it
from legalese, since the two are often confused, especially by the general
public. In looking closely at the legal writing that lawyers produce from
day-to-day (such as pleadings, briefs, opinion letters, contracts, leases,
securities offerings), it strikes me that we encounter two distinct types
of legal writing: (i) legal writing that is highly technical but nevertheless necessary and appropriate to express a specific legal relation, and
(ii) legal writing that is verbose and gratuitously technical, serving no
purpose other than to mystify and shroud the subject matter in a veil of
overblown prose. We can understand the former as legal writing and the
latter as legalese. I want to focus initially on legalese before turning to
legal writing.
The term legalese is generally employed in a pejorative sense to denote
verbose technical jargon and Latin phrases that obscure an otherwise

7. As Karl Marx aptly stated, "The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a
nightmare on the brain of the living." The Eighteenth BrumaireofLouis Bonaparte,in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 595 (Robert Tucker ed., 1978). By way of example, one cannot
practice real estate law without affirming a system of property holdings and land tenures
dating from the Middle Ages.
8. BERNARD JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY 27 (1985).
9. MIRHIAL BAxN, THE DiALOGIC IMAGINATION 65 (1981).
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straightforward text. Properly understood, legalese denotes a degenerate
form of legal writing, where a document becomes distorted with
formalities to the point that its message is no longer clear. This type of
writing has raised suspicions for centuries. For example, Thomas
Jefferson took a jab at legalese when he drafted a clearly written bill
and sent it to a friend with the following instructions:
I should apologize, perhaps, for the style of this bill ....

You,

however, can easily correct this bill to the taste of my brother lawyers
by making every other word a "said" or "aforesaid," and saying
everything over two or three times, so that nobody but we of the craft
can untwist the diction and find out what it means; and that, too, not
so plainly but that we may conscientiously divide one half on each
side.10
For Jefferson, legalese was problematic because it did not add anything
to the underlying point of a text, but instead choked a simple message
with artificial terms and repeated phrases until the original meaning
was lost. This understanding of the term neatly complies with a typical
dictionary definition of legalese: "Language containing an excessive
amount of legal terminology or of legal jargon."1
The central problem of legalese is that it constitutes a secret coding
and phraseology that only lawyers can sort out. Legalese can convert a
simple phrase into a technical one, much in the same way that pig Latin
can convert the simple term "nix" into the otherwise indecipherable
"ixne." In this sense, legalese seems like a special language that lawyers
have developed to fool lay people and create amorphous meanings that
cause endless disputes. This point was expressed in a humorous way by
Will Rogers:
The minute you read something and can't understand it you can almost
be sure that it was drawn up by a lawyer. Then if you give it to
another lawyer to read and he doesn't know just what it means, why
then you can be sure it was drawn up by a lawyer. If it's in a few

10. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Joseph C. Cabell, Sept. 9, 1817, in 17 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 417-18 (Andrew Lipscomb ed., 1905).
11. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 1098 (2d ed. unabridged, 1987). There is also a second
sense to the term, this time captured by the definition of legalese found in the Oxford
English Dictionary: "The complicated technical language of legal documents." 8 OxFORD
ENGLIsH DIcTIONARY 804 (2d ed. 1989). This is the notion of legalese as something that
is perhaps inevitable in the sense that a highly technical language may be necessary to
express the legal relationships which hold in a complicated society. I will be referring to
this kind of language as "legal writing."
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words and is plain and understandable only one way, it was written by
a non-lawyer. 2
To see how legalese obscures an otherwise straightforward text,
consider the following passages, the first of which is expressed in
legalese while the second is stated in straightforward legal writing:
LEGALESE: Know all men by these presents, that for good and valid
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged by the parties hereto, Mr. Jones (hereinafter referred to as the
party of the first part) does hereby undertake, promise, and bind
himself to that certain Mr. Smith (hereinafter party of the second
part), that said party of the first part shall faithfully and honorably
provide full and prompt payment of the sum of Five Hundred Dollars
in lawful currency of the United States of America at such time and
place and in the manner as may be requested at the will of said party
of the second part as set forth in a duly executed notification from said
party of the second part to said party of the first part, the aforesaid
sum representing funds extended to the party of the first part without
the offering of collateral or security from the party of the first part.
LEGAL WRITING: For value received, Mr. Jones ("Payor") hereby
promises to pay to Mr. Smith ("Payee"), on demand, the sum of Five
Hundred Dollars ($500.00), at the time and location set forth in a
written notice to Payor. This promissory note is unsecured.
Notice that the first passage does more than simply convey information in a roundabout way-it also conveys a message by virtue of its
cumbersome style, a message that something very formal is taking place,
a special event shrouded in ceremony, artifice, and packaging; thus it
says something by virtue of its form, though nothing of substance is
added by virtue of the added language, and in fact the artificial style
obscures the relative simplicity of its legal effect. It is also noteworthy
that the second passage has been cleared of legalese, yet still contains
technical legal terms in its own right, which suggests that a certain
amount of formal terminology is essential for a legal document to have
its intended effect because ordinary words are not sufficient to express
complicated legal relations (here, the debtor/creditor relationship). So
the impact of legalese is not derived from any genuine content that it
delivers but rather from the mise en scene that it provides, much in the
way that church services are peppered with Old English or Latin
phrases to add an element of tradition and high seriousness.

12. Will Rogers, The Lawyers Talking, July 28, 1935, in 6 WILL ROGERS' WEEKLY
ARTICLES 243, 244 (Steven K. Gragert ed., 1982), reprintedin THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
AMERiCAN LEGAL QuOTATIONs 290 (Fred Shapiro ed., 1993).
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Intellectually speaking, legalese raises very little debate, because
almost everybody (except a few hardliners) is convinced that legalese
serves no purpose and ought to be eliminated."3 In addition, many
jurisdictions have passed "plain-English" laws that require insurance
companies, landlords, and car dealers to use contractual language that
is clear and concise. 4 And the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now
require merely a "short and plain statement of the claim" instead of the
formal method of pleading that once prevailed."5 It seems that the
over-formality and emptiness of legalese are something of a legal relic,
dating from the days when pleadings had to be stated in precise terms,
and where the law relied heavily on formal oaths and affirmations."
Such language is out of place in a legal system that is moving toward
informal styles of pleading and proof.
Clearly, then, we should.try to eliminate legalese. But what about
legal writing considered as a highly technical mode of expression in its
own right? Is legal writing something that we should strive to eliminate
as well? Would it be possible to not only rid the law of legalese, but to
eliminate legal writing altogether, so that pleadings and other legal
documents could be phrased completely in plain English? If so, this
would make the law understandable by everyone and would eliminate
the need for lawyers. This idealized vision of a lawyerless world recurs
in utopian visions from Plato's Republic to the Militia Movement, and
finds expression in the enduring popularity of Shakespeare's famous
passage, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."' Obviously,
much of the anti-lawyer sentiment is a hostile reaction to the powerlessness that clients feel when caught in a system that they do not
understand. Hence the idea that if we could only get rid of the lawyers,
everything would become crystal clear. Thomas More articulated such
a vision in his depiction of a utopian state:
13. T. Seldon Edgerton, In Disgust of Legalese, 66 MICH. B. J. 306 (1987); Paul
Marcotte, The Write Stuff, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 34 (federal judge orders attorney to
revise pleading by removing "excessive capitalization, empty formalisms, obscure
abstractions, and other conceptual and grammatical imbecilities."); Stephen Hunt, Drafting:
PlainEnglish Versus Legalese, 3 WAIKATO L. REV. 163 (1995).
14. See, e.g., NEW YORK GEN. OBLIG. § 5-702 (1994), requiring leases to be "written in
a clear and coherent manner using words with common and every day meanings."
15. FED. R. Cwr. P. 8. Despite this rule, in one case the Complaint and related papers
totalled over four thousand pages spread throughout eighteen volumes. Gordon v. Green,
602 F.2d 743, 744 (5th Cir. 1979).
16. MELLINKOFF, supra note 6, at 183-85.
17.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH, Act 4, sc.

2. In its popularized form (as a catchphrase for lawyer-bashing), this quotaation is taken
out of context; in fact, Shakespeare probably intended this passage to seem comical. See
DANIEL KORNsTEIN, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS? SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL APPEAL 22 (1994).
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For, according to the Utopians, it's quite unjust for anyone to be bound
by a legal code which is too long for an ordinary person to read right
through, or too difficult for him to understand. What's more, they have
no barristers to be over-ingenious about individual cases and points of
law. They think it better for each man to plead his own cause, and tell
the judge the same story as he'd otherwise tell his lawyer. Under such
conditions, the point at issue is less likely to be obscured, and it's
easier to get at the truth-for if nobody's telling the sort of lies that
one learns from lawyers, the judge can apply all his shrewdness to
weighing the facts of the case, and protecting simpleminded characters
against the unscrupulous attacks of clever ones."8
But is such an arrangement possible? On this question of whether
formal legal writing could (or should) be eliminated, I will turn to the
case against legal writing mounted by Fred Rodell, a Legal Realist from
Yale Law School who advanced the position that 'legal terminology is a
completely artificial language serving no useful purpose.
II.

WHY LEGAL WRITING CANNOT BE ELIMINATED: THE CASE OF FRED
RODELL

Fred Rodell was a notable figure in the Legal Realist movement
during the 1930s.19 He taught at Yale Law School (an elite school)
despite his thinly-veiled contempt for lawyers and the legal system. In
an infamous book that has earned cult status, Woe Unto You, Lawyers!,2' Rodell decried legal jargon as "professional pig Latin" and
characterized the practice of law as a "high-class racket."2 ' Rodell saw
legal discourse as a completely artificial language designed solely to
obfuscate:
The Law, regardless of any intellectual pretensions about it, does not
at bottom deal with some esoteric or highly specialized field of activity
like the artistic evaluation of symphonic music or higher calculus or
biomedical experimentation. If it did, there would be reason and
excuse for the use of language unfamiliar and unintelligible to ninetynine people out of a hundred. Nor would the ninety-nine have any
cause to care. But the fact is that Law deals with the ordinary affairs
of ordinary human beings carrying on their ordinary daily lives. Why

18. THOMAS MORE, UToPiA 106 (1965).

19. An excellent discussion of Rodell is set forth by Ken Vinson, Fred Rodell's Case
Against the Law, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (1996).
20. FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERsl (2d ed. 1957).
21. Id. at 11, 16.
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then should The Law use a language... which those ordinary human
beings cannot hope to understand?'
Rodell answered this rhetorical question by asserting that the complex
nature of legal writing is a subterfuge for abuse by those inside the
confidence game of the legal system:
The answer is, of course, that the chief function which legal language
performs is not to convey ideas but rather to so conceal the confusion
and vagueness and emptiness of legal thinking that the difficulties
which beset any non-lawyer who tries to make sense out of The Law
seem to stem from the language itself instead of from the ideas--or
lack of ideas-behind it. It is the big unfamiliar words and the long
looping sentences that turn the trick. Spoken or written with a
straight face, as they always are, they give an appearance of deep and
serious thought regardless of the fact that they may be, in essence,
meaningless. 23
To support his position that legal writing is a purely fictitious language,
Rodell relied on the positivist notion that legal terminology creates a
fantasy world because it does not correspond to anything in the "real
world"; legal relations are a kind of secret language that lawyers conjure
up and impose on nonlawyers. 2 ' Rodell concedes that doctors and
engineers need a specialized language to describe physical phenomena
for which ordinary language is lacking (such as "mitochondria" and
"entropy"), but law deals with everyday occurrences that do not need a
special language: "A common street brawl means nothing to a lawyer
until it has been translated into a 'felony,' a 'misdemeanor,' or a
'tort."' Rodell's utopian vision foresaw a society in which the law was
clearly stated in terms that could be understood by laymen, where
lawyers and technical lawyer-speak are superfluous. Rodell's point is
that lawyers live in a make-believe world of their own creation, that they
propagate empty words, "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." 6
Rodell tries to bolster this position by comparing two criminal
statutes:2 7 The first statute simply states, "Anyone who spits on this
platform will be fined five dollars;" the second provides, "Anyone who

22. Id. at 126-27.

23. Id. at 127-28.
24. The positivist claim here is that a term is meaningless if it does not generate a
statement that can be empirically verified by the senses. A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH,
AND LoGic 35 (1952): "We say that a statement is factually significant to any given person

if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express."
25. RODELL, supra note 20, at 10.
26. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act V, sc. 5.
27. RODELL, supra note 20, at 13.
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willfully and maliciously spits on this platform will be fined five dollars."
According to Rodell, the addition of the phrase "willfully and maliciously" creates an amorphous standard that allows endless room for debate,
because these terms cannot be pinned down-hence, a defendant can
forestall conviction by arguing that he did not spit willfully and
maliciously, thereby raising a disputed issue for trial. According to
Rodell, most legal terminology operates like the terms "willfully and
maliciously," producing interminable debate because such terms are
impossible to fix with precision. Rodell's solution would be to revise the
law so that we remove all the vague terminology and replace it with
plain English.2"
In assessing Rodell's position, we should keep in mind that his
importance lies not in the strength of his argument (which I will show
is weak) but rather in the fact that he nicely articulates an anti-lawyer
sentiment widely shared in the general population, and shamelessly
propagates the ages-old desire to reduce the law to exact statements that
do not admit of multiple interpretations and fuzzy boundaries.
However laudable his intentions, Rodell's critique of legal writing falls
victim to a series of key mistakes. First, he misses the fact that most
legal relations are not "ordinary" events that can be described in simple
terms. Even a standard commercial lease needs to be drafted so that
certain key issues are addressed in advance-base rent, security deposit,
cancellation procedure, duties of the parties as to repairs, condemnation,
subletting, assignment, and so on. These matters are sufficiently
complex to warrant a special terminology, because ordinary English
would be too long and cumbersome. Suppose, for example, that it was
always necessary to erase the phrase "This is an unsecured loan," and
instead write out its full meaning in understandable English: "This is
the type of loan that is not supported by any collateral, so if the person
who signs the promissory note fails to make the payments, then the
lender must sue to get a judgment against the borrower and then enforce
the judgment to get at the borrower's property." This would make legal

28. Of course, we should note that Rodell's preferred statute would impose a fine on a
person who spits out a rancid drink, thereby criminalizing a healthy reflex. Rodell also

fails to see that the terms he finds objectionable in the second statute (willfully and
maliciously) are precisely the terms that make the statute fair by restricting its application

to cases of intentional spitting, a narrowing that is required precisely because the strippeddown version of the statute is overbroad. Rodell misses the trade-off inherent in legal
drafting: if the statute is written in stark terms (as Rodell suggests), it imposes strict
liability against those who spit for good reason; this can be remedied by adding the terms
"willfully and maliciously,' but only at the cost of introducing ambiguity and indeterminancy. Rodell's mistake is to naively presume that there is a perfect solution to this tradeoff, when in fact we are inevitably forced to compromise.
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documents impossibly long, especially when dealing with such complex
notions as subrogation, convertible bonds, and summary judgment. In
a highly-specialized world with an advanced division of labor, it is
inevitable that lawyers draft some very complicated documents that can
only be understood by other lawyers. Indeed, we should be thankful that
shorthand terms are available to express the relations between the
parties, even as we share Rodellrs concern that the general public cannot
understand such language.
Rodell's second and more fatal mistake is to think that legal concepts
are meaningless because they do not correspond to physical objects; he
mistakenly assumes that language must correspond to a material object
to be meaningful, a view that makes little sense when we pause to
consider how much time we spend talking about love, friendship, and
faith, none of which are physical entities. Even money, which seems
fairly concrete, takes its meaning not from its physical properties but
from the collective intentionality imposed on it. Crudely put, certain
little pieces of green paper have value because we collectively recognize
this value, but value is not inherent in green paper. While Rodell and
other legal realists are correct that a corporation is in some sense a
fictional entity that cannot be found in a particular time and place (IBM
is not some entity apart from its shareholders, directors, and employees) 29 and a stock certificate is a mere piece of paper, they fail to

appreciate the beauty of law (in this case, corporate law) in giving rise
to nonphysical entities like corporations and shares. This is not "hocuspocus" (to use Rodell's terminology) but rather a creative project of
fashioning new forms of association and new social institutions. The
legal entities that we create do not map onto an antecedent reality, but
rather bring a world into being, so it is no wonder that they do not
correspond to physical objects. Rodell sees this as a sign that the law
has left the ground and spins circles in the air, but this conclusion is too
dramatic. Our response to the make-believe quality of many legal
concepts should be one of cautious celebration and wonder: through a
series of speech acts and pronouncements, lawyers conjure up new
realms of legal relations and new causes of action. In this sense, the law
can be highly creative. One might say, following philosopher Nelson

29. This point was made famous in Gilbert Ryle's example of the visitor to Oxford who
is shown the various buildings and dormitories and responds by asking, "But where is the
University?," as if the University was something greater than the sum of the parts that he
had just seen. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949). A similar rejection of
transcendental entities can be seen in Jerome Frank's claim that "Many lawyers are still
infected with that scholasticism which converts abstractions into independent entities
having an 'out there' character." JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 315 (1930).
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Goodman, that law is a "way of worldmaking," a conceptual scheme that
gets played out in the real world."0 Stephen Burton captured this point
nicely when he noted that the "local law of a society represents a
possible organization of human relations, and a public commitment to
bring it into empirical being." 1 Understood in this sense, lawyers
actually work wonders with language, creating something akin to a
cognitive grid or conceptual scheme for human affairs. This 'way of
worldmaking' is carried out on two levels: first, in the creation and
destruction of new legal entities and new causes of action by legislators
and judges; and second, in the actions of individual lawyers who use the
concepts and language of the law to fashion solutions for clients (for
example, by characterizing a client's injury as a tort instead of a breach
of contract, or by setting up unique business entities and arrangements,
such as sale-leasebacks, convertible bonds, and irrevocable insurance
trusts).
We should pause to consider this sense in which legal language does
not simply map onto a pre-existing world but actually creates a world
that is reinforced in subsequent legal discourse. Catharine MacKinnon
captured this act of creation nicely when she noted that sexual
harassment was a "feminist invention."2 Amazingly, the act of
creation is often followed by a forgetfulness that treats the created object
as something that has always existed in roughly the same form. For
example, the tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is
a relatively recent invention,' yet this cause of action is now so
ingrained that most young lawyers are surprised to learn of its recent
vintage. The corporation is a relatively recent invention, a legal fiction
that, strictly speaking, does not exist as an entity in time and space, 34
yet we treat corporations as if they are organic beings (indeed, corpora-

30. GOODMAN, supra note 4, at 22: "Comprehension and creation go on together."
31. Stephen Burton, quoted in STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE
SPEECH, AND ITS A GOOD THING, Too 171 (1994).
32. CATHARINE MACKINNON, Sexual Harrassment: Its First Decade in Court, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 103 (1987).
33. William Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40 (1956) (referring to
intentional infliction of emotional distress as a "nameless wrong"); State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952) (Traynor, J.) (recognizing a new cause of action
for emotional distress).
34. "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it .... " Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall, J.). More recently, the Seventh Circuit noted
that "itihe corporation is just a convenient name for a complex web of contracts among
managers, workers, and suppliers of equity and debt capital." Scandia Down Corp. v.
Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1985).
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tions are "persons" under the law, subject to formation, merger, and
dissolution). Although corporations are created in words (by submitting
articles of incorporation to the state authorities, adopting by-laws, and
so on) and exist only on paper as it were, they nevertheless have a real
physical effect on the world. Similarly, property law binds and
structures the physical world, since nature does not automatically divide
land into neat parcels, nor does nature dictate that land be held
privately in fee simple. Yet this way of owning property is so ingrained
that it seems inevitable, an attitude reinforced by the physical division
of property into parcels and by such documents as deeds, title insurance,
and land surveys.
If I am correct, Rodell was mistaken in his attempt to rid the law of
abstractions and generalizations. Legal language is not something that
we might otherwise avoid with careful or proper English, but is simply
a built-in feature of the social practice of law, in the same way that
medical terminology is an inevitable part of the practice of medicine.
Just as a doctor says "hypothermia" instead of "the cooling of the blood
to such an extent that damage may occur to the heart, lungs and brain,"
lawyers say "unsecured promissory note" instead of "a promise to pay a
certain amount of money that is not backed by collateral." Even if we
remove the verbiage and jargon from legal documents, there remains a
layer of technical terminology that is necessary for the law to exist as a
social practice.
Instead of wondering why legal writing is so abstract and indeterminate, perhaps we should reverse the inquiry and wonder why Rodell and
his ilk pursue the impossible goal of perfect clarity in language. It
seems that Rodell's project of demystifying legal language has a parallel
in the Enlightenments search for a perfect universal language that
matched with reality point for point, with no excess terms or ambiguity.
The Enlightenment philosopher Leibniz took this quest seriously,35 a
project ridiculed by French philosopher Jacques Derrida as the search
for a "transcendental signified," an absolute endpoint where language
maps onto the world point for point.3" Derrida and other postmodern
thinkers point out that words are elusive and slippery, full of ambiguity
and polysemy, a point expressed nicely by literary theorist Roland
Barthes:
We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single
"theological" meaning (the "message" of the Author-God) but a multi-

35. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Letterto NicolasRemond, January10, 1714, in LEIBNZ,
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS AND LETTERS 654-55 (Leroy Loemker ed., 1969).
36. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 76-93 (1976).
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dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original,
blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the
innumerable centres of culture.37
If this is correct, searching for absolute clarity of language is futile; the
best that we can do is to reduce confusion by trying to write clearly
while openly acknowledging that multiple readings are inevitable. In
law, as in life, ambiguity must be expected.
Ultimately, Rodell's project smacks of the positivist quest to rid
language of non-verifiable statements under the ruse of labeling such
statements "meaningless." As philosopher John Searle notes, this quest
arises because many of our cherished social institutions do not have a
physical presence and exist solely by virtue of agreement and cooperation. Searle nicely captures the feeling of wonder at the ephemeral
nature of social institutions: "In our toughest metaphysical moods, we
want to ask ... are these bits of paper really money? Is this piece of
land really somebody's privateproperty? Is making certain noises in a
ceremony really getting married?"' The answer is, of course, yes. Just
as it is a mistake to conclude that money, property, and marriage are
not real because they do not relate to physical entities, it is equally
mistaken to presume that lawyers do not do anything real because they
deal with nonphysical entities such as corporations, or because they use
amorphous terms like "willfully and maliciously." Legal writing and
legal concepts create a real world of social institutions, a world that is
more abstract than the "real" world of physical objects but also more
important because it gives shape and order to human involvement with
the world. For example, it is true that a building cannot be constructed
without bricks and cement, but these resources can only be utilized in
a coordinated way against a backdrop of property holdings, labor
relations, architectural contracts, building permits, and other legal
matters that must be in place before construction begins (in this sense,
the abstract categories of the law precede the physical contact with real
objects). Although Rodell draws a negative inference from the fact that
legal language does not refer to physical phenomena, one should instead
draw a positive inference, namely that legal writing provides tremendous
freedom for lawyers to fashion new causes of action and new forms of
association. To see legal writing in this light is to capture the sense in
which it is a highly creative act, something akin to painting or literary
creation. Sadly, however, an ever present danger is that the creative
aspect of legal writing will be ignored, repressed, or denied, with the

37. ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MusIc-TExT 146 (1977).
38. JOHN SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 45 (1995).
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result that legal writing devolves into conformist connect-the-dots
drudgery, a downward trajectory that I will chart in the next section.
III.

SOME DANGERS OF LEGAL WRITING

If I have established that legal writing (or at least some form of legal
techno-speak) is necessary, it does not follow that it is ethically neutral.
The problem does not lie with the use of technical language per se, but
the rigid application and blind adherence that it engenders. As noted
earlier, obedience to tradition is inevitable if one is to play the game of
the law, but lawyers tend to get trapped in a hermeneutic circle that
endlessly affirms the existing arrangement. For example, one can
hardly broach the issue of real property from a legal perspective without
somehow affirming the language of the existing power structure-fee
simples, rights of reversion, easements, leaseholds, and rules of descent;
a real estate lawyer must affirm and legitimate this system regardless
of her personal feelings about it. Legal discourse will always be loaded
in this way, but I believe that law can be changed for the better if we
learn to recognize the dangers and distortions inherent in our use of
standard legal writing. In what follows, I will articulate four such
dangers: (1) the obscuring and mystifying of power relations; (2) the
narrowing of thought and emotion; (3) the tyranny of formal rationality;
and (4) the need for a privileged class of experts (lawyers) to unravel a
legal system that is spinning out of control.
Danger 1: The Obscuring and Mystifying of Power Relations
Many legal documents are phrased in technical, formal, and neutral
terminology that obscures the actual power relations at play between the
parties. This is accomplished by presenting such an overwhelming
amount of detail, using such formal language, that the reader loses sight
of the ethical question of who is doing what to whom. This style of
writing parallels the radical decentralizing of power relations in society
over the last century. As sociologist C. Wright Mills pointed out, the
individual is no longer physically coerced so much as intellectually
manipulated through endless rules and bureaucracy:
Under the system of explicit authority, in the round, solid nineteenth
century, the victim knew that he was being victimized, the misery and
discontent of the powerless were explicit. In the amorphous twentiethcentury world, where manipulation replaces authority, the victim does
not recognize his status .... In this movement from authority to
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manipulation, power shifts from the visible to the invisible, from the
known to the anonymous.3 9
Mills's point is that the raw exercise of power is being replaced by a
subtle, seemingly consensual coercion based upon formal rules and
regulations. So instead of the ruthless landlord who throws tenants out
into the street, one is evicted by a management company acting under
a standard form lease that bears one's signature; instead of being fired
at the whim of a maniacal boss, one is "downsized" pursuant to
regulations in a four-inch thick employee handbook tucked away in a
remote comer of one's desk. The modern power relations are not
significantly less oppressive than they used to be, but they are highly
rationalized and decentralized, to the point where the victims can only
throw up their hands and blame "The System." The entire effect is
captured brilliantly by John Steinbeck in The Grapes of Wrath, where a
Midwestern farmer is told that the sheriff evicting him is the servant of
a bank, which is itself subservient to a board of directors back East, at
which point the farmer asks, "Then who can I shoot?"'
To see how authority becomes diffuse and difficult to pinpoint,
consider the following passage from an Industrial Building Lease that
landed on my desk recently:
In the event of termination of this Lease for any reason, Landlord shall
not be liable for any costs, expenses, fees, demands, setoffs, or accounts
of Tenant, and Tenant shall receive a return of Security Deposit,
subject to adjustment as set forth below; Tenant shall remain liable for
(i) all sums owed to date to third parties (including without limitation,
all taxes and charges for utilities and other services to the Premises),
(ii) all Base Rent, Additional Rent and other amounts due Landlord
and any third parties under this Lease, (iii) all damages, costs and
expenses sustained, suffered, or incurred by Landlord or applicable
third parties to the date of such termination, (iv) all costs, fees and
expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by Landlord hereunder or
in connection with any bankruptcy proceedings of Tenant or Tenant's
guarantor, if any, and/or in connection with renting the Premises to
others from time to time (collectively, "Termination Damages"), and (v)
additional damages constituting accelerated rent, which shall be an
amount equal to (as of the date of termination) all Base Rent and
Landlord's estimate of all Additional Rent and other sums which, but
for the termination of this Lease, would have become due during the
remainder of the Term (collectively, "Residual Damages"). In calculating Residual Damages, for each Lease Year following termination
(including the Lease Year in which the termination occurs) (A) annual

39. C. WRiGHT MILLs, WHITE CoLLAR 110 (1956).
40. JOHN STEiNBECK, THE GRAPEs OF WRATH 49 (1976).
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Additional Rent payable shall be conclusively presumed to be equal to
the annual Additional Rent payable with respect to the prior Lease

Year, or portion thereof (on an annualized basis), preceding termination and increased at a rate of 5% per year (or such higher rate as
Landlord may reasonably determine taking into account reasonable
estimates of future costs) for the remaining portion of the Term; and

(B) annual Base Rent ....
Two things are worth noting about this passage. First, the detail is so
great that the reader loses sight of who is doing what to whom, let alone
whether the provision is morally acceptable. Second, the use of formal
terms creates an impression of equality and consent, when in fact the
Landlord is a large management company while the Tenant is a sole
proprietor with little bargaining power. The purpose of the provision is
to allocate costs and expenses when the Lease terminates: it ensures
that if the Lease is terminated by the Tenant, the Landlord will get
every possible cent back 'for its troubles, while the Tenant will get
nothing if the Landlord terminates. Witness the sleight of hand by
which power becomes diffuse and coercion takes the form of a free
contract: instead of a nakedly one-sided provision ("Landlord gets full
reimbursement of all expenses if Tenant terminates, but Tenant will not
get the same"), we find a mystifying provision so detailed that its onesidedness is lost. A similar process takes place in litigation, where
"kicking someone out of the house" becomes "a cause of action based on
forcible detainer," and where "firing for no reason" becomes "discharge
pursuant to employment at will." The formal legal terminology glosses
over the power relations and covers them in a patina of rationality,
distance, and dignity.41 When used in this way, legal writing legitimates and extends oppressive power relations by recharacterizing them
as formal, consensual, and rational: remember that even an unconscionable contract takes the form of a voluntary transaction. Of course,
those with bargaining power benefit from recharacterizing power
relations as consensual; thus we find powerful corporations trying to
convince courts that the hapless consumer consents to the minutiae in
her form contract, and that a lessee consents to the forfeiture provisions

41. The best example of how legal ideology and formalism obscure unequal power
relations can be found in Anatole France's quip about the "majestic equality of the law":
"[It] forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and
to steal bread." LE LYS ROUGE (1894), quoted in THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS

(Angela Partington ed., 1992). France's point is that the formal equality of the law is
belied by the substantive inequality between members of the various social classes.
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in her lease.42 The. task for the critical scholar is to unmask seemingly
consensual relations and to expose them as a naked exercise of power.
Danger2: Narrowing the Range of Thought and Emotion
In Nineteen Eighty-Four,George Orwell painted a bleak picture of a
totalitarian state ruled by Big Brother. The protagonist, Winston Smith,
worked in the Records Department, where he had the task of rewriting
the old newspapers. At lunch one day, Smith sits through a frightening
speech by the government philologist, who is busy creating the
dictionary for the new official language, Newspeak:
Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range
of thought? ... Every year fewer and fewer words, and the range of
consciousness always a little smaller .... By 2050--earlier, proba-

bly-all real knowledge of Oldspeak will have disappeared. The whole
literature of the past will have been destroyed. Chaucer, Shakespeare,
Milton, Byron-they'll exist only in Newspeak versions, not merely
changed into something different, but actually changed into something
contradictory of what they used to be ....

The whole climate of

thought will be different. In fact there will be no thought as we
understand it now. Orthodoxy means not thinking-not needing to
think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness.'
Of course there is no Big Brother standing atop our legal system, but the
language of the law (especially the language used in commercial
transactions) nevertheless employs a restricted range of thought and
emotion, as if all vestiges of affect have been repressed. In some ways,
legal documents are like Newspeak, not a language specifically designed
for thought control, but something that narrows the range of thought in
a de facto way by drawing strict limits around what counts as a legal
argument. The language of the law is like a game that one can play if
one accepts certain basic concepts as building blocks of the game but
which are not themselves open to debate. So we can write in a highly
specialized way about property law ("springing remainders," "fee
simples," "easements by prescription") only if we assume that property
should be privately held, a silent assumption that radically narrows the
range of discussion because it rules out alternative property holdings,
such as collective ownership or state ownership. There is little room
within the practice of law to question the basic presuppositions of the

42. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Line v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (upholding forum
selection clause in fine print on reverse side of cruise ticket); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding arbitration provision in computer box shipped to
consumer).
43. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FouR 46-47 (1948).
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legal system (private property, wage labor, individual tort liability),
which means that the great bulk of legal writing takes place within a
limited theoretical range.
The danger here is that an air of inevitability attaches to the existing
concepts and language in a particular area of law, as if these legal
entities/concepts/doctrines were a part of nature itself. This phenomenon
has been aptly described as reification,a process where contingent social
relationships are mistaken for relations between objects or as the
property of objects." This term has its origins in Marx's analysis of
commodity fetishism, where he noted that people crave gold, diamonds,
and paper money as if these objects were inherently vested with the
magical property of generating income, when in fact social relations
invest these otherwise useless objects with value.4 Commodification
is complete when the worker relates to herself as a thing to be sold in
the market instead of a person with value in her own right. The
phenomenon of reification is common among lawyers, resulting chiefly
from the mistake of projecting legal conceptions onto nature. By way of
example, lawyers tend to see real property as if it were divided by
nature into discrete parcels and held by individuals in fee simple,
instead of seeing this arrangement as one of many ways that land can
be distributed. In a similar sense, workers see it as natural and
inevitable that they receive wages instead of an ownership stake in the
enterprise where they work. Occasionally, we need to be reminded that
the categories of legal thought are constructs that can be deconstructed,
so we do not fetishize the existing arrangement as static and unchanging.
One could say that the law describes relationships formally and onedimensionally, disguising the substantive differences between the
parties. Thus we speak of "landlord/tenant relations" instead of
"property controller/renter relations," "employer/employee relations"
instead of "owner/hireling relations," and our court pleadings speak of
"constructive discharge" instead of "making life miserable for a worker,"
"forcible detainer" instead of "kicking someone out on the street."'

44.' The leading analysis of reification is offered in GEORG LUKAcs, Reification and the

Consciousnessof the Proletariat,in HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 83-110 (1971).
45. KARL MARX, CAPITAL, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER, supra note 7, at 320-21: "A

commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of
men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that
labour .... [A] definite social relation between men [assumes] the fantastic form of a
relation between things."
46. Some of the older digests used legal categories that were less veiled, such as
"master-servant" (now, employer-employee) and "bastards" (now, illegitimate children). See
Permanent A.L.R. Digest (1949) for these categories.
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Lawyers use language in a way that flattens out the world as experienced, by removing emotion from law, in a way that seems reasonable
and rational but which nevertheless expresses a value choice precisely
in the suppression of emotion, because those with power are more likely
to frame their legal writing in a cold and calculating manner. For this
reason, literary critic Roland Barthes was correct to assert a direct link
between power and language:
Language is legislation, speech is its code. We do not see.., that all
speech is a classification, and that all classifications are oppressive
.... To speak, and with even greater reason, to utter a discourse is
not, as is too often repeated, to communicate; it is to subjugate ....
In speech, then, servility and power are inescapably intermingled.47

Because the language of the law tends to favor those with a stake in
perpetuating the system, it comes as no surprise that few legal terms are
available for describing oppression and coercion-"unconscionable" is
one, "duress" is another-but in general the law is phrased in a way that
stresses formality over nuance, ignoring the substantive lived experience
of the actual people affected by law.
To some extent, the law should be rational and restrained, unaffected
by subjective desires. As Aristotle pointed out, "He who bids the law
rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids
men rule adds an element of the beast.' However, all of this restraint
and rationality can have a distorting effect when it glosses over social
relations that are arbitrary and irrational. For example, we use the
term "employment-at-will" to designate that both an employee and an
employer can terminate the work relationship when they want, but since
this terminology is neutral between the parties, it obscures the fact that
the employee comes off much worse than the employer. After all, the
employee labors in fear of being terminated and cannot compel the
employer to give a guarantee of continued employment, whereas the
employer can protect itself by having the employee sign a noncompetition agreement. Contemporary legal discourse as propagated by judges
and lawyers seems like a neutral medium since it constitutes the only
officially accepted manner of speaking and thinking about the law. But
the existing discourse of law is not neutral-it codifies a particular world
and then chastises alternative visions as extreme, impractical and
untenable; in other words, the existing system of rights is fetishized.

47.

ROLAND BARTHES, Inaugural Lecture at College du France, reprinted in THE

BARTHES READER 460-61 (1994).
48. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Bk III, sec. 1287al, line 28, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1985).
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This leads to a decline in critical and dialectical thinking among lawyers,
who lose the ability to think beyond the current arrangement.'
There is doubtless an element of mental conversion that takes place
when a lawyer is narrowly constricted to a closed universe of legal
concepts and categories.' And the confining stricture of legal thought
and language has an adverse impact on the psychology of individual
lawyers, because legal writing is such a stultifying genre. It creates a
flat universe, one that is frankly boring, obscuring at the same time that
it indulges in extreme detail, so that legal documents must be read
carefully and with a skeptical eye to grasp what is really going on."
For example, the following is an excerpt from a tender offer that came
across my desk recently:
If, on or after the date hereof, the Company should declare or pay (or
set a record date with respect to the payment of) any dividend on the
Shares or make any distribution (including, without limitation, the
issuance of rights for the purchase of any securities) with respect to the
Shares that is payable or distributable to shareholders of record'on a
date prior to the transfer to the name of the Purchaser or its nominee
or transferee on the Company's stock transfer records of the Shares
purchased pursuant to the Offer, then (1)the purchase price per Share
payable by the Purchaser pursuant to the Offer will be reduced by the

49. Herbert Marcuse nicely captured the marginalization of critical thought: "As the
power of the given facts tends to become totalitarian, to absorb all opposition and to define
the entire universe of discourse, the effort to speak the language of contradiction appears
increasingly irrational, obscure, artificial." Herbert Marcuse, A Note on Dialectic, in THE
ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT SCHOOL READER 447-48 (Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds. 1994).
50. Patricia Williams expresses this point nicely: "[Llegal language flattens and
confines in absolutes the complexity of meaning inherent in any given problem." PATRICIA
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 6 (1991). Allan Hutchinson also stresses

the narrow confines of legal language:
Legal language shapes those social encounters that fall within its reach. As
disputes move into the magnetic field of law, they are "translated" into the
received argot. In this way, legal discourse enforces the canons of relevance and
rationality that it generates for its self-serving purposes. This encoding process
changes and thereby screens out many disputes.
ALLAN HUTCHINSON, DWELLING ON THE THRESHOLD: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON MODERN LEGAL
THOUGHT 15 (1988). Thinkers such as Williams and Hutchinson draw attention to the
limits of the existing legal system as a closed system, and they want to investigate the
forces that shape the contours of this system, thereby excluding certain claims (or ways of
speaking and writing) as non-legal. This can be seen as an extension of the postmodern
emphasis on that which lies at the margins-or outside-a given text, such as the text of
the law. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Tympan, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY x (1982).
51. In an astute assessment, James Elkins suggests that the affect of legal writing is
"flat, technical, and formulaic. Its favorite color is gray. Its neurotic styles: depression and
denial .... " Elkins, supra note 2, at 115.
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amount of any such cash dividend or cash distribution and (2) any such
non-cash dividend, distribution or right to be received by the tendering
shareholders will be received and held by the tendering shareholders
for the account of the Purchaser and will be required to be promptly
remitted and transferred by each tendering shareholder to the
Depositary for the account of the Purchaser, accompanied by appropriate documentation of transfer.
Weeding one's way through this tortured prose, one would not suspect
that the basic idea here is fairly simple-to cover the situation where a
dividend is declared or paid before the shares are actually tendered, to
make sure that the purchase price is reduced by the amount of the
dividend. And the section is not badly written compared with other
documents that I spend my days reviewing. Nevertheless, this style of
writing is disturbing and distancing on some level.
In thinking about this passage and others like it, the first thing to
notice is the gulf that separates this type of language from our normal
way of speaking, how it hovers above the rhythm of life, like some type
of alien-speak that uses super-long, dry, emotionless sentences. This
emotional distancing insulates the attorney from the real-world effects
of his actions, much in the same way that a bureaucrat tells himself that
he is only doing his job and is not responsible for the effects of a system
in which he functions as a mere cog. That is, the attorney can rationalize that she is simply preparing a corporate document at the request of
a client, which is essentially a personal and not a political act. After all,
the lawyer is simply doing her job, and to do this she must write and
speak in this fashion-if she declined to do it, then another lawyer would
surely take her place.
Despite this disclaimer, the lawyer is nevertheless performing a
political act in preparing standardized documents, because by using such
dry and formalistic language, she is actually disguising the social
implications of the legal work she is performing, and this concealment
has ethical implications. Consider the tender offer document discussed
above: on one level, it merely states the terms and conditions for a
purchase of shares, and the lawyer can comfort himself that his task is
complete if the document is internally consistent and contains the
information required by the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the state corporation laws. But the tender offer is also a document with
a social impact that will alter the lives of workers and the community.
By isolating the legal formalities from the broader social context (by
focusing only on the rules instead of the social effect of the tender offer),
the attorney silently endorses the tender offer whether she wants to or
not, lending it legitimation. This is the beginning of the process by
which lawyers become apolitical, by distancing themselves from the
ethical implications of their clients' actions and focusing solely on the
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production of legal materials as if they worked in a vacuum. Small
wonder that this process produces lawyers who lack individuality and
refuse to consider the social effects of the transactions that they
facilitate, because the actual implications of their work are clouded in
obscure language far removed from the flesh-and-blood of those affected
by it. This often results in a psychological condition known as spliting,52 a defense mechanism where a painful experience is warded off
by disownership; hence the lawyer reconciles herself by saying that she
is really two separate people--one at work and one in private. This
operates on two levels: on a psychological level it allows the lawyer to
make it through the day by divorcing her "true" personality from the
false self who is performing mundane legal work, and on a moral level
it relieves the attorney of responsibility for the consequences of her
work. As a split personality, the lawyer has a nagging sense of always
standing outside herself, with her "true-self' watching her "lawyer-self."
Unfortunately, most lawyers do not recognize their own voice in the
language that they use on a daily basis, nor do they see themselves
reflected in their work. Perhaps this is why they often have a sensation
of playing a role in a drama constructed by somebody else.
My point is not that legal writing always masks and distorts, but
rather that it can work in this way, and that repeated exposure to it
prevents one from seeing how it distorts. A person who drafts legal
documents all day begins to think in the terms that he is using,
narrowing his universe of thought until it becomes coterminous with the
existing legal arrangement. As a remedy for this, lawyers should set
aside time for nonlegal activities that introduce alternative viewpoints,
through theater, movies, fiction, or simply by envisioning a more
multidimensional world than the one depicted in their legal documents.
It is crucial to remember that the legal world that we create and
perpetuate is a contingent world, one among many possible worlds that
we might bring into existence. The evils of this society-poverty, racism,
alienation, homelessness-are tied up with the existing legal system,
which creates these evils just as surely as it creates' multinational
corporations, insurance trusts, and limited liability companies. An
inescapable irrationality confronts any person who studies law and the
legal system: we have constructed an edifice of dizzying complexity
when it comes to business and taxation, but we still cannot provide basic
rights to housing, child care, health insurance, and job security.

52. See Jeffrey Lustman, On Splitting, 32 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD
119 (1977).
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Danger 3: The 7yranny of Formal Rationality
Earlier in this Century, sociologist Max Weber pointed out that a new
form of rationality-formal rationality-was gaining ascendency in
Western industrialized nations. This was due in part to the rise of
science during the Enlightenment, as scientists became increasingly
adept at devising formulae and schema for manipulating the physical
world. A similar transformation was taking place in politics and
morality, as formal rules gradually replaced the irrational and mystical
elements of our culture (for example, marriage was transformed from
holy matrimony to a secular contract, the divine right of kings was
replaced with democratic rule, and the artisan was overtaken by the
profit-driven corporation). Over time, rationality begins to eclipse the
emotional, subjective, value-laden, qualitative side to our personalities.
Weber calls the resulting experience disenchantment:loss of the sacred,
the mysterious, the unexplainable."
Weber pointed out that formal
rationality employs a high degree of logic and rule-following, which we
can understand as instrumental reasoning,the ability to pass from one
point to another within a given system without stepping back to consider
the substantive values and moral orientation of the system. Instrumental reasoning creates efficient systems for getting from point A to point
B, but it leads to the eclipse of substantive reasoningabout larger issues
of politics, morality, and justice (for example, instrumental reasoning
cannot tell you whether we should go from point A to point B).
According to Weber, we are witnessing the rise of people who are totally
rule-based and decry every attempt to look beyond the rules as
impractical and pointless. That is, the rules become sacrosanct, an endin-themselves, followed mechanically. Weber feared that an increasing
number of daily activities would become excessively rule-governed and
rationalized. Hence his prognosis for the men of the future: "Specialists
without vision, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it
has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.'
Weber
referred to this tendency to get locked into formal rationality as the "iron
cage" of rationality, sometimes understood as "the irrationality of
rationality," where a highly rationalized and rule-governed system is
nevertheless irrational when viewed from a perspective outside the

53.

Speaking of the rise of rationality, Weber writes, "[I]t means that... there are no

mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle,
master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted." From MAX
WEBER: EssAYs INSocioLoGY 139 (H.H. Gerth and C.Wright Mills eds. and trans., 1946).
54. MAX WEBER, THE PROTEsTANT ETHic AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 182 (1930).
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system." A good example of hyper-rationalism and hidden irrationality
is provided by the Internal Revenue Service and the Income Tax Code.
Our tax reporting system is exceedingly rational and rule-governed--all
of the necessary forms are provided along with detailed explanations--but tax lawyers get lost in these myriad rules and fail to see that
the whole process (conceived from outside by the general public) is
highly irrational, frustrating, and impossible to navigate. This
sentiment was echoed by none other than Justice Learned Hand:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession:
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception--couched
in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of.... I know that
these monsters are the result of fabulous industry and ingenuity [yet]
I cannot help recalling a saying of William James about certain
passages of Hegel: that they were no doubt written with a passion of
rationality; but that one cannot help wondering whether to the reader
they have any significance save that the words are strung together
with syntactical correctness.'
All of this relates to the practice of law in two ways. First, lawyers
become so enmeshed within highly regulated areas of law that they lose
sight of any alternative arrangement of the legal system-in Weber's
terms, they become "specialists without vision." Second, legal practice
takes on the quality of a highly complicated game where victory is
narrowly sought at the expense of considerations of justice, where the
law is viewed as a mere means to be manipulated in the service of a
client instead of being respected as a social achievement of considerable
magnitude.
I see these problems constantly among the lawyers with whom I come
into contact--they will take any position allowed within the bounds of
the law, totally unable to see a larger picture than their immediate task
of winning a case. These lawyers are adept at rationalizing any action
that their client wants (however dubious or unethical) because of their
55, As Karl Lowith explains, this condition involves an affirmation of the existing social
arrangement and the inability to see beyond it to a better way of life:

The positive opportunity presented by this disillusionment of man and of the
disenchantment with the world is the sober affirmation of this everyday life and
its demands. At the same time, the affirmation of this everyday life signifies the
negation of all transcendence, even that of progress. Progress then means merely
a moving forward along the predetermined rails of fate, with passion and
resignation.
KARL LowrrH, Weber's Interpretationof the Bourgeois.CapitalisticWorld in Terms of the
GuidingPrinciple of Rationalization,'in MAX WEBER 119 (Dennis Wrong ed., 1970).
56. Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
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duty to zealously represent the client. Here the lawyer sinks into his
role as an advocate and forgets his larger role as a member of society
and an officer of the court, indeed as a statesman. Because of this
process, lawyers engage in highly complicated (and utterly rational) legal
maneuvering, but in doing so they fail to question the ethics of what
their client is directing them to do. They keep telling themselves that
they have a duty to zealously represent the client, and this mantra
prevents them from thinking about the ends (or values) that they are
furthering in their unthinking application of the law as a mere
instrument to be twisted or pushed in their client's favor.
By way of example, the law firm where I used to work had occasion to
file a lawsuit on behalf of a sales agent who had not received commissions that he had earned. The Complaint attached a copy of the contract
between the sales agent and the company, clearly showing that the
company had failed to pay commissions. After we served the Complaint,
the company's lawyer called me to talk about the suit, and he said the
following, which struck me as bizarre: "I don't care what the contract
says; I can turn anything into its opposite. I can tear apart any
contract, no matter how airtight. I can raise a thousanddefenses to stall
you. I can poke holes in anything." I was not sure what this bravado
was about, but no mention was made of the merits of the lawsuit-the
entire discussion revolved around the rules of law and how they could
be manipulated to reach particular outcomes. The conversation was
completely rational in the sense that we debated legal rules and
procedures, but in a broader sense the conversation was deeply irrational
since it had nothing to do with the justice of the case. He was protecting
his client and I was protecting mine, but we were each locked inside our
private view of the law, discussing the rules as if we were playing a
game. As the model of the ideal lawyer becomes that of a technician
instead of a statesman, considerations of justice start to drop out of the
picture, leaving only a war of each lawyer against all others in a frantic
game from which nobody will raise their head for fear of losing ground.
This situation can only get worse as the law becomes hyper-specialized,
with each attorney keeping her eyes fixed on a mere piece of the whole,
with no regard for the direction of the system as a whole.5 7

57. For an excellent discussion of the shift in lawyers from "statesmen" to "specialists,"

and the consequent loss of ties between lawyers and the larger community, see Jack
Sammons & Linda Edwards, Honoring the Law in Communities of Force: Terrell and
Wildman's Teleology of Practice,41 EMORY L.J. 489, 503-11 (1992).
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Danger 4: The Need for a Privileged Class of Experts to Unravel the
Legal System
As insiders within the legal system, we forget that the mastery of legal
language allows us special access to the law at the same time that it
prevents outsiders from gaining entry. This is becoming more troubling
as the law grows in complexity to the point where it is choked with
details. When the law becomes encyclopedic with statutes and
regulations, it loses the ability to inspire and becomes so technical that
it cannot be used as a guide for ordinary citizens. In this way, legal
language separates ordinary citizens from the law and causes them to
feel alienated and bitter toward the law.
The ill effect of overregulation was captured brilliantly in an otherwise
shrill book entitled The Death of Common Sense." Written by a
frustrated business attorney, this New York Times Bestseller earned a
wide readership for its portrayal of how regulations are strangling small
businesses and entrepreneurs. The author pointed out that common law
principles such as "reasonable notice" and "due care" were flexible and
easily understood, whereas newly-minted statutes are exhaustive and
exacting, to the point where strict compliance is impossible. Discussing
a situation that was heavily reported in the media, the author reminds
us,
Perhaps we should recall President Clinton's search for his attorney
general. Rules about withholding taxes on a babysitter's wages,
extremely precise, turn out to be widely ignored by some of the most
prominent lawyers in the country .... When law is too dense to be
known, too detailed to be sensible, and is always tripping us up, why
should we respect it?
From my own practice, I can report that transactional law is now
dominated by forms that must be filed with state agencies. When
setting up a corporation, lawyers must file all sorts of forms that, to be
honest, nobody is quite sure how to fill out. Every real estate transaction now requires an environmental declaration, not to mention state
and municipal forms, all in addition to the actual legal documents for
conveying the property. This means that whole areas of law that once
involved drafting legal documents (a real lawyer's skill) are now
dominated by forms. This also makes it difficult to learn new areas of

58. Pinup HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994).
59. Id at 49.
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law, since each area is dominated by a special set of forms and regulations.
The problem here is not merely that the law has become tedious and
boring, or that lawyers no longer have basic principles of law to hang
their hat upon, but rather that the law has become fragmented and
complex to the point where even the people on the inside have lost sight
of the system as a whole. The result is a Frankenstein monster of laws
and regulations, one that threatens our ideal of populist democracy.
After all, the democratic ideal is that citizens are consensually bound by
laws that they have approved through their elected representatives. The
moral force of the law rests heavily on the pillars of equal access to law
and due notice of law for all citizens. This ideal is threatened when the
mass of citizens cannot begin to understand the legal system or the
documents that control their lives, a point captured nicely by Peter
Goodrich:
I have been intrigued by one of the major paradoxes of contemporary
legal culture, namely that its social practice is founded upon an
ideology of consensus and clarity-we are all commanded to know the
law-and yet legal practice and legal language are structured in such
a way as to prevent the acquisition of such knowledge by any other
than a ®highly trained elite of specialists in the various domains of legal
study.
When taken to an extreme, the situation becomes that described by
Kafka in his short parable The Problem of our Laws, where a group of
nobles refuses to let the public see the'law, so a segment of the
population naturally comes to believe that there is no law apart from the
arbitrary fiat of the nobles.6 ' In our legal system the law is available
to all, but is so densely worded and cross-referenced that only a few
specialists can make sense of its various pieces. The situation threatens
to become similar to colonial legal systems where the official government
language is spoken largely by imperialists and remains out of reach for
the general population; in such systems, language functions as a political
barrier.
The former dean of Stanford Law School, Bayless Manning, -has
termed our condition hyperlexis: "[Tihe pathological condition of an
overactive lawmaking gland."62 Manning was particularly outraged

60. PETER GOODRIcH, LEGAL DiscouRsEs 7 (1987).
61. FRANZ KAFKA, The Problem of our Laws, in FRANZ KAFKA: THE COMPLETE STORIES
437-38 (1971).

62. Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of ConservationofAmbiguity: Thoughts
on Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9 (1982). One law professor recently referred to the tangle
of statutes, case decisions, and regulations as "Tyrannous Lex." Thomas Baker, Tyrannous
Lex, 82 IOwA L. REv. 689 (1997). We might also recall Grant Gilmore's famous equation:
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when the Treasury Department issued 110 single-spaced pages of
regulations to clarify the distinction between "debt" and "equity" under
Section 385 of the Tax Code. As Manning complained,
[R]egulation has become so elaborate and technical that it is beyond
the understanding of all but a handful of Mandarins... [and] only the
largest enterprises can afford to pay for the professional help that is
required to pick one's way through the thicket .... The law must rely
fundamentally on the voluntary compliance of the citizenry. The legal
system of a democratic society cannot operate-and that means that a
democratic society cannot operate-if the law is allowed to become so
elaborate that it is beyond the reach of the informed, literate citizen
who would like to be law abiding. An automobile driver must not be
forced to consult an expensive law firm to find out (a) that the speed
limit is 55 miles per hour and (b) whether he is doing 55 miles an hour
as defined by the regulations. If we let that happen to our law, the
people of the United States are simply going to say "To hell with it."6
Part of the problem here is that the rule of law is becoming too
fragmented; in fact, there is no longer a rule in-the strict sense but a
complex and impenetrable web of regulations propagated by federal and
state administrative agencies, municipalities, commissions, and other
bodies. A set of regulations so diffuse and piecemeal cannot command
respect or legitimacy, because nobody can be put on notice of it in
advance, and so few people can understand it.
The pathology here lies in the erosion of the ideal of self-government,
by the people for the people. The rules have become so complex that no
person, no group of persons, could ever claim that the laws are selfimposed, precisely because the citizens cannot begin to understand the
laws and regulations in the first place. Even the officials inside the
system (that is, judges and lawyers) have only a small glimpse of pieces
of the whole, because the entire system has grown baffling, unfathomable, like the infinite Library of Babel in Borges's fable." To those on
the outside (that is, laypeople), there is no way to understand the law
internally in terms of validity and legitimacy, but instead the law is
understood externally, as a system of punishments imposed capriciously
by an insular cadre of officials. Therein lies the pathology-the law is
so complex and over-regulated that even to those on the inside, it often
seems arbitrary and groundless.

'The worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law,
and due process will be meticulously observed." GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERiCAN

LAW 111 (1977).
63. Id at 13.
64. JORGE LuIs BORGES, The Library of Babel, in LABYRINTHS 51-58 (1962).
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Brevity and succinctness mark the documents that continue to inspire
successive generations of Americans, documents such as the Declaration
of Independence and the Constitution. To be sure, rough edges and
ambiguities abound in the Constitution (what exactly is "due process?"),
but it is short enough to be understood as a whole, as a document with
clear purpose and design, something that the individual citizen can
affirm as his own. We cannot compare this sentiment with the feeling
engendered by staring at five thousand pages of single-spaced Medicare
regulations. . What is lost is precisely the experience of seeing oneself
reflected in the laws made by one's representatives, which is essential
to democracy. To be sure, any society as complex as ours will need a
complex legal system. Yet as I have documented, there is a widespread
sentiment that the legal system is spinning out of control, like a monster
that no longer heeds the call of its master. The language of the law is
directly related to this sense of confusion. If we continue our present
course, we are headed toward a legal system of mystifying complexity,
administered by a select group of insiders who know only a small corner
of the system, surrounded by an expanding ring of outsiders who are
growing increasingly frustrated. Here we see that an overreliance on
complicated legal writing has the adverse effect of alienating those who
stand outside the legal system. This should give us pause before we
employ legal language that is tortuous and far beyond the comprehension of reasonable, educated people.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have tried to articulate how a certain amount of legal
terminology and a certain formal style of legal writing are inevitable in
a highly complicated society. I have also shown the folly of attempting
to eliminate legal writing altogether and replace it with straightforward
English. In making these points, I have tried to emphasize the creative
aspect of legal writing, how new ways of speaking and writing can lead
to improvements in our social practices and institutions, how lawyers
fashion the world with language. At the same time, I have shown that
the accepted use of legal terminology produces ideological distortions and
lends legitimation to unequal power relations. In one sense, not much
can be done about this because each person alone is somewhat powerless
to change established patterns of speaking and writing, especially when
one's livelihood requires the propagation of this very style. However, a
critical awareness of the dark side of legal writing might cause lawyers
to adopt an ironical or skeptical posture toward their language, or cause
them to hesitate before applying legal language unreflexively. This
would not have a measurable effect on legal practice or legal doctrine,
but it could make the law more humane.
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Our understanding of the power and dangers of legal writing would be
heightened if legal writing courses were to assume a more central role
within the law school curriculum. As noted earlier, legal writing is
generally marginalized as a skills course where students apply doctrines
learned in substantive courses. This creates the misleading impression
that legal writing involves primarily the application of pre-existing rules
to a static set of facts, a presumption reinforced by popular legal writing
techniques such as the IRAC system.5 Under this approach to legal
writing (which has its roots in Langdellian formalism)," legal writing
is neither creative nor dangerous, and it has no personal or social
consequences; it is simply a mechanical skill that one picks up as an
adjunct to "real" courses in the law. But if I am correct, legal writing is
both creative and dangerous. Every time that a lawyer drafts a legal
document and speaks in the language of the law, she is making a
personal and political choice, depicting and shaping a world by following
a tradition or subverting it. This is doubly true for those of us who
teach legal writing because we invest our students with an orientation
toward the nature of legal writing one way or another. Paradoxically,
we empower our students by explaining how the law is creative,
indeterminate, fluctuating, and malleable, how fact patterns are shaped
by narrative framework, prejudice, and ideology. We disable students
by telling them that the law consists of ready-made rules to be
discovered and applied to pre-existing facts, because this shrouds the
existing legal rules in a veil of necessity and legitimation. If I am
correct in urging that legal discourse is a "way of worldmaking," then we
are morally responsible for both the legal world that we create with our
language, and for the depiction of the law that we transmit to our
students.

65. See, e.g., CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 58-59 (1994).
66. Christopher Columbus Langdell was Dean of Harvard Law School in the 1870s,
during which time he introduced the casebook method of legal education, now the dominant
paradigm in American legal education. Langdel) advanced a formalist model which
depicted the law as a system of autonomous, universal rules that could be applied
deductively to pre-existing fact patterns. See Thomas C. Grey, LangdeU's Orthodoxy, 45
U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1983).

